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This paper provides a learning justiﬁcation for limited forecast equilibria, i.e.,
. strategy proﬁles such that 1 players choose their actions in order to maximize the
discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts
. and 2 forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. The limited forecast
equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable outcomes of a simple learning
. process involving vanishing trembles. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁca-
tion Numbers: C72, D83. Q 1998 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Several approaches to bounded rationality in repeated games have been
considered so far. A ﬁrst approach is concerned with the complexity of the
 strategies used by the players Neyman, 1985; Rubinstein, 1986; Kalai and
. Stanford, 1988 , and some authors suggest including complexity concerns
 in the objective of the players Rubinstein, 1986; Abreu and Rubinstein,
. 1988 . Another approach restricts the attention to strategies with bounded
. recall for example, Lehrer, 1988 , or combines complexity ideas with
. bounded recall ideas Kalai and Stanford, 1988 . Finally, some of the
. learning or the evolutionary game literature assumes that the players are
 myopic even though they act in a long-run environment for example,
. Jordan, 1991 .
. Jehiel 1995 considers an alternative approach to bounded rationality ￿
taking the view that when the horizon is too long individuals are unlikely
to be able to correctly forecast the entire future. Individuals are assumed
to form predictions about what will happen in a limited horizon future.
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They subsequently make their decisions on the basis of their limited
. horizon forecast. Speciﬁcally, Jehiel 1995 considers two-player repeated ￿
alternate-move games with arbitrary ﬁnite action spaces A , i s 1,2. Each i
. player i s 1,2 repeatedly makes his choice of current action in A on the i
basis of his limited n length-forecasts.
1 The limited forecast equilibrium is i
. referred to as n , n -solution and deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle such that 12
. 1 players choose their actions so as to maximize the discounted average
. payoff over their horizon of foresight and 2 the limited horizon forecasts
formed by the players are correct on and off the equilibrium path. It can
. be shown that there always exists at least one n , n -solution and that the 12
. period t limited horizon forecasts of any n , n -solution repeat cyclically 12
as the time period t varies. The length of a cycle induced by any
. n , n -solution can be bounded by K, where K depends on the lengths of 12
 foresight n and the cardinality of the action spaces A only see Jehiel, ￿ ii
. 1995 .
The objective of this paper is to provide a learning justiﬁcation for the
correctness of equilibrium forecasts on and off the equilibrium path. We
. follow Kalai and Lehrer 1993a in that the learning process takes place
within the play of the game. Initially each player i has a belief over several
possible forecasting rules, which are sequences of n -length forecasts one i
for each period where this player must move. At each period the player
. who must move either 1 selects an action based on his belief so as to
. maximize the discounted average payoff over the next n periods or 2 i
trembles with a small probability, and may choose any action with positive
. probability see Selten, 1975 . Player i subsequently observes the played
actions in the past periods, gathers them into n -length streams of actions, i
and compares the latter with the predictions associated with each of the
possible forecasting rules, which in turn allows him to update his belief.
Speciﬁcally, when the prediction of a forecasting rule does not coincide
with the observation, then some tremble must have occurred to explain the
observation with that forecasting rule. Such a forecasting rule becomes a
little less plausible relative to those forecasting rules whose prediction ﬁts
with the observation. Besides, we assume that each player restricts himself
.  to a limited though arbitrarily large number of plausibility levels to be
. deﬁned below . Also, when the player cannot discriminate which forecast-
ing rule is the most plausible one, we assume that with positive probability
he may change his state of belief resulting in a possibly new most plausible
forecasting rule. Finally, we assume that the supports of initial beliefs of
the players are ﬁnite and contain all cyclical forecasting rules with a length
of cycle less than or equal to K, which ensures that the forecasting rule of
1 Rational and myopic behavior correspond to an inﬁnite and zero length of foresight,
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. at least one n , n -solution is contained in the initial support of each 12
player.
2
The main result of this paper is that, as the probability of trembling
converges to zero, the players eventually play almost surely as in a
. n , n -solution. In other words, the stochastically stable outcomes of the 12
. process deﬁned by the above learning story coincide with the n , n - 12
solutions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to justify a
bounded rationality solution concept as a result of a two-player-learning
process where the learning takes place during the play of the game. This
. should be contrasted, for example, with Binmore and Samuelson 1992 ,
. who apply evolutionary ideas population learning to the ﬁnite automaton
 framework and obtain results that differ from the solution concept pro-
. posed by Rubinstein, 1986, and Abreu and Rubinstein, 1988 .
Technically, the analysis borrows from the pioneering work of Foster
. and Young 1990 which was further developed and applied by Kandori
.  . . et al. 1993 , Young 1993a, b , Fudenberg and Harris 1992 , Noldeke and ¨
. .  Samuelson 1993 , Kandori and Rob 1995 , and others see Kandori, 1996,
. for a survey . Those works were primarily applied to evolutionary contexts,
and the noisy character of the process was interpreted as a probability of
mutation rather than a probability of tremble. It turns out that similar
techniques can be applied to our framework too. Intuitively, the stochasti-
cally stable outcomes correspond to the absorbing sets of the process
without trembles which are hardest to destabilize, i.e., from which it is
hardest to get out. In our framework, the absorbing sets of the process
. without trembles correspond to the self-conﬁrming n , n -solutions, i.e., 12
strategy proﬁles such that the associated n -length forecasts are correct i
 only on the equilibrium path see Fudenberg and Levine, 1993, and Kalai
and Lehrer, 1993b, for a similar concept in a framework with perfect
. . rationality . We next observe that destabilizing a n , n -solution requires 12
several non-isolated trembles, whereas isolated trembles are enough to
.  . destabilize a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution that is not a n , n , solu- 12 12
. tion . Since the former type of events is much more likely than the latter, it
follows that, in the limit as the probability of trembling converges to zero,
. a n , n -solution is eventually played with probability 1. 12
In Section 2 the model is described. The solution concept is deﬁned in
Section 3. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, present and analyze the learning
2 It should be noted that in general there will be forecasting rules in the support of the
players’ belief such that the forecast at some period is inconsistent with the forecast at a later
period. That is, the consistency attached to the inﬁnite horizon of the game is not required at
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process. A discussion follows in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs
are gathered in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
We consider discounted repeated alternate-mo¨e games with two players
i s 1,2. Player i chooses actions a from a ﬁnite action space A . Players ii
act in discrete time, and the horizon is inﬁnite. Periods are indexed by t
. t s 1,2,3,... . At time t, player i’s single period payoff is a function of
the current actions a
t of the two players i s 1,2, but not of time: i
 tt . u s ua , a. Players move sequentially and player 1 moves ﬁrst. At each ii 12
. odd period t s 2k y 1 t s 1,3,5,... , player 1 chooses an action that
remains the same for the two periods t and t q 1: a
2k s a
2ky1 for all k. 11
. Similarly, player 2 moves at each even period t s 2kt s 2,4,6,... and
a
2kq1 s a
2k. Each player i s 1,2 discounts the future. The discount factor 22
of player i is denoted by d . i
 t4`  2ky12 k 4 ` 2 k y 1 A stream of action proﬁles q s q , q , where q g A it s 11 2 k s 11 1
and q
2k g A is referred to as a path and is denoted by Q. Since players 22
may only change actions every other period, a move at period t affects
2k  payoffs both at periods t and t q 1. In path Q, each action q resp. 2
2kq1. . q of player 2 resp. 1 is thus combined both with the previous action 1
2ky1  2k. 2kq1  2kq2. q resp. q and the next action q resp. q of player 1 resp. 12 12
. 2 : At periods 2k and 2k q 1, the current payoffs to player i induced by
 2ky12 k . 2 k q 12 k . 3 path Q are uq , q and uq , q , respectively. We ﬁrst intro- i 12 i 12
duce some preliminary and standard notation.
. Notation. 1 Let R denote an arbitrary n-length stream of alternate n
. actions. n R denotes the discounted sum of the per period payoffs to in
player i induced by R where each action of R is combined both with the nn
. . previous except for the ﬁrst one and the next except for the last one
. action of R . For example the 4-length stream R s a , a , b , b , where n 41 2 1 2
.  .  .  . a , b g Ainduces: n R s n aabb sua , a q d ub , a q ii i i 4 i1212 i 12 ii 12
. 2 . d ub , b. ii 12
. wx t 4 ` 2 Q denotes the truncation of path, Q s q , to the ﬁrst n ni t s 1
wx t 4 n wx t
Y
t 4 t s t
Y
XX actions, i.e., Q s q , and Q s q is the associated stream of ni t s 1 ti t s t
actions from period t
X to period t
Y.
. 
X .  t 4 t
Y X
X 3 q , q denotes the concatenation of q s q with q s it s t
t 4 t
Z

X . t 4 t
Z
YX q : q , q s q . it s t q 1 it s t
3 Single period payoffs start at period 2.PHILIPPE JEHIEL ￿ 278
3. THE LIMITED FORECAST EQUILIBRIUM
Players are assumed to make limited predictions about the forthcoming
moves after their own move. Player i only considers the forthcoming ni
moves after his own move, and subsequently makes his choice of current
. action on the sole basis of his predictions. Jehiel 1995 introduces a ￿
solution concept along this line where the predictions made by the players
may depend on the past N actions together with the currently played
action and the time period. The dependence on the past N actions can be
 shown to play no role as far as the set of solutions is concerned Jehiel, ￿
. . 1995 , and the analysis of the learning process see below could trivially be
extended to that case. For notational convenience, we will therefore
assume that the limited predictions formed by player i depend only on the
action to be currently chosen by this player and the time period. We now
introduce some deﬁnitions and notation.
Deﬁnitions and Notation
.  . 1A n -length pure prediction for player i is a stream of alternate i
. actions of length n starting with an action in Aj / i . The set of ij
. n i r 2 n -length predictions is denoted by P , where P s A = A if n is in n j i i ii
.  n i y 1 . r 2 even and P s A = A = A if n is odd. nj i j i i
. 2A n -length forecast for player i at a period t where this player i
must move is denoted by f
t. It maps the set of actions A to be currently ii
chosen into the set of predictions P . Formally, f
t: A ª P where ni i n ii t . fag Pis the prediction about the forthcoming n actions made by ii n i i
player i at period t if he currently chooses a . i
.  t 4 t 3 fs f is a forecasting rule. It is a sequence of forecasts f ii t i
one for each period t where player i must move. The set of f is denoted i
. F F . A forecasting rule proﬁle f , f g F F = F F is denoted by f, and the i 12 1 2
set of f is denoted F F.
. 4 A pure strategy for player i is denoted by s . It is a sequence of i
functions s
t, one for each period t where player i must move. The i
function at period t, s
t, is the behavior strategy of player i at that period. i
It determines player i’s action at period t as a function of the last action
played by j. Formally, s
t: A ª A .
4 The set of player i’s strategies is ij i
. denoted by S . A strategy proﬁle s , s is denoted by s, and the set of i 12
strategy protiles S = S is denoted S. 12
4 s t may only depend on the last action because forecasts are assumed to be history-inde- i
pendent. Observe that the period 1 behavior strategy does not depend on the previous action
since there is no such action, and therefore s 1 g A . 11LEARNING LIMITED FORECAST EQUILIBRIA 279
. Any strategy proﬁle s g S generates a path denoted by Q s s
 t. 4 .  . t q s , i s 1 resp. 2 if t is odd resp. even . Let H H denote the set of it
histories of alternate actions of length t. Let h be an arbitrary history of
length t y 1, i.e., h g H H
ty1. The strategy proﬁle and the path induced by s
<  < . on the subgame following h are denoted by s and Q s , respectively. hh
Given h g H H
ty1 and the action a g A at period t, the continuation path ii
.  < . induced by s after h, a is thus Q s . ha i i
The limited forecast solution concept requires two conditions. First,
players use the discounted average per period payoff over the length of
foresight as their criterion to select current actions:
DEFINITION 1. A strategy s g S is justiﬁed by the forecasting rule ii
 t 4 f s f g F F if ii t i
; t , ; a g A s
t a g Argmaxn aaf
t a , . . . jj i j i j i i i
a i
where a stands for the period t y 1 action of player j, j / i. j
Throughout the paper we will consider generic values of the payoffs in
the sense that for i s 1,2 there is no a g A , a g A , a
X / a g A , jj ii i ii
X . 
XX . p g P , p / p g P such that n aap sn aap . Thus, in Deﬁni- in iin i j i i i j i i ii
 t . . t . tion 1, Arg max n aaf a is a singleton, and s a s ai j i i i i j i
 t . . Argmax n aaf a . ai j i i i i
The second requirement is that players’ equilibrium forecasts are re-
lated to equilibrium strategies by a consistency relationship, where consis-
tency means that forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path,
. t . i.e., for every h, a the period t forecast if player i chooses a , fa , ii i i
coincides with the truncation to the ﬁrst n actions of the continuation i
w  < .x path induced by s, Q s . ha n i i
 t4 DEFINITION 2. f s f g F F is consistent with s g S if for every ii t i
t y 1 t . period t where player i must move: ;a g A , ;h g H H , fas ii i i
w  < . x Q s . ha n i i
. To summarize, a n , n -solution is a strategy proﬁle that can be 12
justiﬁed by consistent forecasting rules for players 1 and 2:
.  . D EFINITION 3 The Solution Concept . A strategy proﬁle s s s , s 12
. g S is a n , n -solution if and only if there exists a forecasting rule 12
. proﬁle f s f , f g F F such that, for i s 1,2, 12
. 1 s is justiﬁed by f ii
. 2 f is consistent with s. iPHILIPPE JEHIEL ￿ 280
The forecasting rule proﬁle f appearing in Deﬁnition 3 is uniquely
deﬁned given the strategy proﬁle s ; we say that f is associated with s.
.  . The properties of n , n -solutions are analyzed in Jehiel 1995 . In ￿ 12
. particular, it is shown that n , n -solutions always exist and can be 12
constructed backwards. Moreover, the forecasting rule f associated with a i
. 5 t . t q k. n,n -solution is cyclical, e.g., 'k s.t. ;t, f ? s f ? . The minimal k 12 ii
such that the latter property holds for the equilibrium forecasting rules of
both players is referred to as the length of the cycle induced by the
. n , n -solution. It can be shown that the length of the cycle of any 12
. . n , n -solution is no greater than an upper bound Kn, n which 12 12
 depends only on the lengths of foresight n and the cardinality of the i
<< . 6 action spaces A . i
The consistency requirement introduced in Deﬁnition 2 assumes that
forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. For the analysis of
the learning process it will be convenient to introduce an alternative
.  . weaker notion of consistency termed subjecti¨e consistency for which
forecasts are correct on the equilibrium path but not necessarily off the
 equilibrium path see Fudenberg and Levine, 1993, and Kalai and Lehrer,
. 1993b . The weaker notion of consistency leads in turn to a weaker
. solution concept that we call self-conﬁrming n , n -solution. Formally, 12
.  t 4 D EFINITION 4 Subjective Consistency . f s f g F F is subjecti¨ely ii t i
consistent with s g S if, for every period t where player i must move,
. w . x t . w< . x h , as Q s « fas Q s ha . it i i i n i
. D EFINITION 5 Self-Conﬁrming Limited Forecast Equilibrium . A strat-
. . egy proﬁle s s s , s g S is a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution if and 12 12
. only if there exists a forecasting rule proﬁle f s f , f g F F such that, for 12
i s 1,2,
. 1 s is justiﬁed by f ii
. 2 f is subjecti¨ely consistent with s. i
Finally, for the following analysis it will be convenient to introduce the
t t. following notation: Qf ; awill denote the stream of actions from period i
t on induced by the period t action a
t and the forecasting rule proﬁle i
. f s f , f , where each player i selects in time the action that maximizes 12
the discounted average payoff over the forthcoming n periods as given by i
7 U. 1  1 . his forecasting rule f . Qfwill denote the set of all paths Qf ; a i 1
. generated by the forecasting rule proﬁle f s f , f with arbitrary ﬁrst 12
period actions a
1. 1
5 . Jehiel 1995 considers the case where there is no discounting. However, the mentioned ￿
properties trivially extend to the case with discounting.
6 .   << << . Maxn1, n2.q1 . Speciﬁcally, Kn, n sMax A , A ; see Jehiel 1995 . ￿ 12 1 2
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4. LEARNING AND LIMITED FORECASTING
The objective of this paper is to provide a justiﬁcation for why forecasts
should be correct as a result of learning. The basic view is that each player
i restricts his endeavor to trying to understand what the forthcoming ni
moves will be as a function of his current action. To this end, he forms a
belief over forecasting rules where forecasting rules specify how to make
n -length predictions in the dynamic environment of the game. At each i
. period the player who must move either 1 selects an action based on his
. belief or 2 trembles, i.e., makes a mistake. The mistakes occur with a
small probability, and the player may then choose any action with positive
probability. When he does not tremble, player i selects an action which
maximizes the discounted average payoff over the next n periods accord- i
. ing to his belief. The selection is typically based on that or those
forecasting rule which is currently the most plausible one. Player i subse-
quently observes the played actions in the past periods. As soon as a new
n -length prediction can be compared with a realized stream of actions, i
player i asks himself, for each possible forecasting rule f he may consider, i
whether the prediction associated with f is compatible with the observa- i
tion or whether some mistake is required to explain the observation with
f .
8 A forecasting rule whose prediction does not ﬁt with the observation i
becomes a little less plausible relative to a forecasting rule whose predic-
tion ﬁts with the observation. Also, each player i is assumed to restrict
. himself to a ﬁnite number of plausibility levels to be deﬁned below , and
when there are several forecasting rules that are candidates for being the
most plausible one, the player may change his state of belief with positive
probability resulting in a possibly new most plausible forecasting rule.
The main result of the paper is that provided the support of the players’
initial belief is ﬁnite and contains all forecasting rules which have a cycle
.  of length no greater than K, where K ) Kn, n so that the forecasting 12
. rules of n , n -solutions belong to the supports of initial beliefs, see the 12
. end of Section 3 , we are sure that, as the probability of making a mistake
. goes to zero, a n , n -solution is eventually played with probability 1. 12
Before we describe the learning process, we wish to point out that the
above learning story does not require a great sophistication on the part of
the players. First, even though the set of all forecasting rules is quite large,
the support of player i’s initial belief is not required to contain inﬁnitely
many of these.
9 Speciﬁcally, it is required to be ﬁnite and contain all
cyclical forecasting rules of length no greater than K. The ﬁniteness of the
8  The underlying idea is that when player i looks at the previously played actions including
. his own actions he does not know whether those result from trembling or not.
9 . This should be contrasted with Kalai and Lehrer 1993a , who cannot a priori assume the
. initial supports of the players to be ﬁnite; see also Nachbar 1997 .PHILIPPE JEHIEL ￿ 282
support of player i’s belief seems a desirable assumption given that a
boundedly rational player may not be able to keep track of the plausibility
of inﬁnitely many forecasting rules. Also, because cyclical forecasting rules
of length no greater than K have a simple structure, they are more likely
to be considered in the support of belief of the players.
 Second, it should be noted that some forecasting rules including cyclical
. ones are such that the n -length forecast of one period is not consistent i
with that of a future period.
10 Each player i is allowed to assign positive
weight to such forecasting rules which are dynamically inconsistent, and
therefore we impose no restriction on the dynamic consistency of the
forecasting rules to be considered by the players. It turns out, however,
that inconsistent forecasting rules will eventually appear to be less plausi-
ble as a result of learning because they are less compatible with the
observations. Further comments about the learning process will be pre-
sented in Section 6.
4.1. The Learning Process
The Mistakes
At each period where he must move, player i may tremble with probabil-
. ity « where « should be thought of as being small . The trembles at each
 period are independent from each other and stationary i.e., independent
. of the history of plays . When he trembles, player i may choose any action
. a g A with a positive probability assumed to be independent of « . For ii
example, each action a g A may then be played with the same probabil- ii
<< ity 1r A . It should be pointed out, however, that the choice of a speciﬁc i
distribution is immaterial for the asymptotic results to be described below
as long as every action is played with a strictly positive probability.
State of Belief and Forecasting Rules
Each player i has a belief over a ﬁnite support of forecasting rules
denoted by F, where F is assumed to include the set of all cyclical ii
.  forecasting rules with a cycle length no greater than K, K ) Kn, n see 12
. above . For simplicity, we will present the argument for the case where the
support F consists only of cyclical forecasting rules, i.e., ;f g F, 'k, s.t. i ii
t q k . t. .  . ; t ,f ? sf ? , but we do not require the cycle of f g F i.e., k to be ii i i
 necessarily smaller than K. The analysis could easily be extended to the
case where F contains also forecasting rules that are cyclical only after i
. some time period. The state of belief of player i is meant to represent the
10 t. t q 1t q 2t q 3 t q 2  t q 2 . X t q 3t q 4t q 5 For example, if n s 3, fas aaa and fas aaa with ii i j i j i i j i j
a t q 3 / a
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plausibility of every forecasting rule f g F based on past observations. ii
We assume that player i restricts himself to k levels of plausibility where i
k is assumed to be sufﬁciently large, i.e., no smaller than n q 1. Forecast- i i
ing rules which belong to level 1 are the most plausible ones, those in level
2 are the second most plausible ones, and so on till level k , which contains i
the least plausible forecasting rules. A state of belief for player i is
denoted by s . It maps the support of forecasting rules F into the set ii
4 4 . 1,...,k . Formally, s : F ª 1,...,k , where sf is the plausibility ii i i i i
.  . 4 level of forecasting rule f . We denote by Sksf g F r sfs k , and ii i i i i
. by S S the set of all states of beliefs s such that S 1 has cardinality 1, i.e., ii i
for which there is one and only one most plausible forecasting rule.
Beha¨ior and State of Belief
When player i does not tremble at period t his choice of action is
 determined by his current or most recently formed, see below the timing
. ty1 of updating state of belief s and the action a played by player j at ij
period t y 1. The state of belief s to be considered by player i will always i
.  . be such that S 1 has cardinality 1 see the discussion section below , and i
therefore s g S S . We let f
U denote the most plausible forecasting rule ii i
. according to s , i.e., the only forecasting rule f g F such that sfs 1. ii i i i
When he does not tremble, player i selects an action a
t so as to maximize i
the discounted average payoff over his horizon of forecast as given by his
currently most plausible forecasting rule f
U. That is, he selects i
a
t s Argmax n a
ty1af
U t a . / ii j i i i
a g A ii
. which is uniquely deﬁned given the genericity assumption .
Updating the State of Belief
A the end of period t q n , where period t is a period where player i i
has moved, player i may check his period t forecast for every forecasting
rule f g F. A new state of belief can then be formed. Let s
ty2 denote the ii i
 state of belief of player i that prevails immediately before period t q n it i
. has thus been formed in period t q n y 2 . Let a be the action played at ii
wx t q n i period t, and let h be the stream of actions played from period t q 1 tq1
to period t q n . Player i’s new state of belief is denoted by s
t.I ti s i i
t . updated by comparing the prediction fa of every forecasting rule ii
wx t q n i f g Fwith the realized n -length stream h . Speciﬁcally, the new state ii i t q 1
tt of belief s is derived from the function s deﬁned by ii
t q n t y 2 t i wx sf if fas h . . t q 1 ii i i t sfs . ii t q n t y 2 t i  wx sf q 1i f fa/ h . . t q 1 ii i iPHILIPPE JEHIEL ￿ 284
. t it adds one increment if the prediction is incorrect . The state of belief si
tt is determined on the basis of s , but s is required to be an element of S S ii i
so that some transformation is required. We let f
U denote the most i
ty2 ty2 U. plausible forecasting rule according to s g S S , i.e., sf s 1. We iii i
note that
U t f g ArgMin sf . . ii i
f g F ii
U U t  . . Case 1 f Is the Only Forecasting Rule Minimizing s ? . Then f ii i
tt .  . remains the most plausible forecasting rule, and sfs Min 1 q sfy ii ii
U U t .. sf, k for all f g F. In other words, when f yields a correct ii i i i i
prediction, the plausibility level of f g F increases by one increment if ii
the maximum level k has not been reached yet and the prediction of f is i
incorrect; it remains the same otherwise. When f
U yields an incorrect i
prediction, the plausibility level of f g F decreases by one increment if ii
the prediction of f is correct, and remains the same otherwise. i
t  . . Case 2 There Are Se¨eral Forecasting Rules Minimizing s ? . Then i
player i’s state of belief switches to some new state of belief s
t g S S ii
according to some distribution assumed to assign positive weight to every
state of belief s g S S . Note that the distribution from which s
t is drawn ii i
t may in general depend on the function s . For example, with probability i
1 y «
X the new most plausible forecasting rule may be one of the forecast-
ing rules
UU UU tt f g ArgMin sf i.e., sf s 1, .  . . ii i i i
f g F ii
the plausibility level of other forecasting rules being updated accordingly,
UU tt t t .  . .  . i.e., sfs 2i f fg ArgMin s ? and f / f ; sfs Min 1 q sf ii i i i i ii ii
X U t t .. y sf, kotherwise. With probability « any state of belief s g S S is ii i ii
equally likely to arise.
Initialization
The above elements of the learning process implicitly deﬁne a stochastic
. process. A global current state in this stochastic process is denoted by g;
.  . it consists of 1 a pair of current state of belief s for each player i s 1,2 i
.  .  .  and 2 a stream of Max n , n q 2 or more alternate actions standing 12
. for the last played actions . The set of states g is ﬁnite. It is denoted by G.
The transition from state to state occurs every other period. The process is
 initialized by considering some arbitrary initial global state. The particular
. choice of an initial state plays no role in the analysis.LEARNING LIMITED FORECAST EQUILIBRIA 285
. 5. LEARNING TO PLAY n , n -SOLUTIONS 12
Two classes of states in G will play a special role in the analysis. The
. . class of n , n -solution states, and the class of self-conﬁrming n , n - 12 12
solution states which are deﬁned by:
.  D EFINITION 6. A state g g G is a n , n -solution state resp. self-con- 12
. . ﬁrming n , n -solution state if there exists a forecasting rule proﬁle 12
.  .  f s f , f associated with a n , n -solution resp. self-conﬁrming 12 1 2
. . U . n , n-solution s g S together with a path Q g Qfgenerated by 12
.  . f s f , f such that 1 f is player i’s most plausible forecasting rule 12 i
 . .  . according to player i’s state of belief s i.e., sfs 1 , 2 player i’s ii i
forecasting rules f g F which yield some incorrect predictions along the ii
. path Q those repeat cyclically because everything is cyclical are among
 . . the least plausible forecasting rules for player i i.e., they belong to Sk , ii
.  .  . and 3 the stream of Max n , n q 2 actions in g coincides with 12
wx t q Maxn1, n2.q2  . Q for some t it corresponds to Max n , n q 2 consecutive tq11 2
. actions in Q .
. In the following analysis, it will be convenient to gather self-conﬁrming
. n , n -solution states which have the same states of belief for players 1 12
. and 2 but which may differ in their streams of Max n , n q 2 actions 12
 due to the position of the cycle in the path Q generated by the self-
. . . conﬁrming n , n -solution . Such sets will be referred to as clusters: 12
.  D EFINITION 7. The set of n , n -solution resp. self-conﬁrming 12
. . n , n -solution states which correspond to the same states of belief for 12
each player i s 1,2 and which may differ only in their stream of
. .  Max n , n q 2 actions is referred to as a n , n -solution resp. self- 12 12
. . . conﬁrming n , n -solution cluster. The set of n , n -solution clusters is 12 12
. denoted E, and the set of self-conﬁrming n , n -solution clusters which 12
are not in E is denoted S.
5.1. Absorbing Sets without Trembles
 We ﬁrst study the learning dynamics in the absence of trembles i.e.,
. « s 0 . The learning process deﬁnes a Markov process, and we are
interested in the stationary distributions of this Markov process. A set of
states is absorbing if it is a minimal set of states with the property that the
Markov process can lead into this set but not out of it. An absorbing set
may a priori contain only a single state in which case it is a stationary state
of the Markov process or it may contain more than one state in which case
the Markov process cycles between states in the absorbing set. It is readily
. veriﬁed that starting from a state in a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution 12
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. only conﬁrm the belief in the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution forecasting 12
rule. More precisely, the system then cycles between the states in the
.  . self-conﬁrming n , n -solution cluster according to the cyclical se- 12
. quence of last Max n , n q 2 actions generated by the path of the 12
. associated self-conﬁrming n , n -solution. The following Proposition es- 12
. tablishes that the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution clusters are the only 12
absorbing sets of the process without trembles.
PROPOSITION 1. The only absorbing sets of the learning process without
trembles are the sets of states in E j S.
5.2. Stochastically Stable Sets
We now proceed to analyze how the dynamics of the learning process is
affected by the presence of rare trembles. For every « ) 0, we ﬁrst note
that the learning process deﬁnes an aperiodic dynamics because it is
always possible to move from one state to another with an appropriate
 number of mistakes and appropriate realizations of the random device in
. the updating process . From the theory of Markov processes, that property
. ensures that 1 the learning process has a unique stationary distribution,
. 2 the proportions of states reached along any sample path approach this
. distribution almost surely, and 3 the distribution of states at time t
approaches this distribution as t gets large.
We thus obtain a unique stationary distribution for each probability of
tremble «. We study the limit of these stationary distributions as the
. probability of mistake « gets small keeping all other parameters ﬁxed .
The limit distribution is termed the stochastically stable distribution.
PROPOSITION 2. The stochastically stable distribution places positi¨e weight
.  . only on n , n -solution clusters i.e., in E and no weight on self-conﬁrming 12
. .  . n , n - solution clusters that are not n , n -solution clusters i.e., in S . 12 12
The technique involved in establishing this result relies on Freidlin and
. Wentzell 1984 . Intuitively, with vanishing trembles the system spends
virtually all of its time in absorbing sets of the learning process without
trembles or equivalently the stochastically stable distribution allocates all
of its probability to such sets. Transitions from one absorbing set to
another can be accomplished only by means of trembles. The system will
asymptotically allocate all of its probability to absorbing sets that are easy
to reach and from which it is hard to get out. The proof of Proposition 2
consists in showing that it is much harder to go from the set E of
. . n , n -solution clusters into the set S of-self-conﬁrming n , n -solution 12 12
. clusters that are not in E than the other way around.
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is thus that eventually players learn
. . to play some n , n -solution as opposed to a self-conﬁrming n , n - 12 12
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. . n , n -solution will emerge, but does not specify further which n , n - 12 12
solution is more likely to emerge. In fact, it may well be that the
stochastically stable distribution assigns a strictly positive probability only
. . to a subset of the n , n -solution clusters as opposed to every n , n - 12 12
solution cluster. Since the main purpose of this paper is to show that some
. n , n -solution will emerge, we do not go into that analysis, but in 12
. principle the n , n -solution concept could be reﬁned on that basis. A 12
. reﬁned n , n -solution would be such that it is reached with a strictly 12
positive probability in the stochastically stable distribution.
The proof of Proposition 2 requires several steps, and introducing some
. new notation. First, for any state g in G, we let Gg denote the set of
states g
X in G such that the states of belief associated with g and g
X may
differ only in their assignment of the players’ plausibility levels of those
forecasting rules which are not the most plausible one. That is, for any g
X
.
X in Gg, player i’s most plausible forecasting rule according to g coincides
with player i’s most plausible forecasting rule according to g, and the
.
X streams of Max n , n q 2 actions in g and g are the same. Assume g is 12
.  . a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state. Then in the dynamics without 12
X . trembles starting from states of belief in g or in any g g Gg yields the
 same sequence of plays i.e., that induced by the associated self-conﬁrm-
. . .
X ing n , n -solution , since g and g have the same most plausible 12
forecasting rules which are always conﬁrmed by the observations through-
out the play. Second, we deﬁne the notions of sequences of trembles and
of isolated trembles.
.  t 4 ` D EFINITION 8. 1 A sequence of trembles is a sequence d , where ts1
d
t s 1 if there is a tremble at period t and d
t s 0 if there is no tremble at
t. It is referred to as an inﬁnite sequence of trembles whenever the number
of periods where d
t s 1 is inﬁnite.
.  t 4 ` 2 A sequence of isolated trembles is a sequence of trembles d ts1
. such that there are at least 2Max n , n periods between two consecutive 12
trembles. That is, if d
t s 1 then d
tq1 s 0, d
tq2 s 0,...,d
tq2Maxn 1,n2.s0.
The following lemma is a key step in the proof of Proposition 2.
.  . L EMMA 1. i Starting from a n , n -solution state g, the system ne¨er 12
. lea¨es the set of states G g whene¨er trembles occur according to a sequence
of isolated trembles.
.  . ii Starting from a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state that is not a 12
. n , n - solution state, there always exists a ﬁnite sequence of isolated trembles 12
. that leads with a strictly positi¨e probability to a n , n -solution state. 12
The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows. Consider a self-conﬁrming
. . n , n -solution state that is not a n , n -solution state. As long as there 12 12
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. self-conﬁrming n , n -solution cluster. By assumption there must exist at 12
. least one time of the cycle induced by the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution 12
where the most plausible forecasting rule of a player, say player 1, yields
an incorrect prediction off the equilibrium path. Assume that a tremble
occurs at such a time, say at period t, and yields an action with an
incorrect n -length prediction according to player 1’s most plausible fore- 1
. casting rule f . Assume also that no tremble occurs before 2Max n , n 1 12
periods. From period t to period t q n y 1, the only effect on player 1 of 1
the period t tremble is to increase the plausibility levels of some forecast-
ing rules which previously had incorrect predictions on the equilibrium
. path and had the prediction ﬁtting with the tremble . It should be noted
that during those periods player 1’s most plausible forecasting rule remains
 the same since the plausibility of forecasting rules having incorrect
predictions on the equilibrium path prior to t can only reach the plausibil-
. ity level k y n at best and k y n ) 1 . At period t q n , the period t 11 11 1
predictions can be compared with the stream of realized actions from
period t q 1 to period t q n . Since there were no trembles during those 1
periods, the current most plausible forecasting rule f of player 1 yields an 1
incorrect prediction, and therefore becomes a little less plausible relative
to any forecasting rule f
X g F having correct predictions both on and off 11
. the equilibrium path for this particular tremble . If such a forecasting rule
f
X happens to be as plausible as f at period t, then the state of belief of 11
player 1 is destabilized and may lead to any most plausible forecasting
rule. Otherwise, after n other periods without trembles, the system has 1
returned to the original state of belief of player 1 except that some
forecasting rules including f
X have now a plausibility level that has 1
reduced by one increment. Clearly after a ﬁnite number of such isolated
. trembles the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state will be destabilized, and 12
. 11 may lead to some n , n -solution state. It should be noted that the 12
same argument would not apply if the most plausible forecasting rule f1
. originated from a n , n -solution rather than from a self-conﬁrming 12
. n , n -solution. The reason is that now at period t q n no forecasting 12 1
rule other than f would see its plausibility level decrease, as the period t 1
prediction of f would be correct. 1
The rest of the proof for Proposition 2 goes as follows. The ﬁrst part of
. Lemma 1 shows that nonisolated or consecutive trembles are needed to
. destabilize a n , n -solution cluster. Proposition 2 is obtained by observ- 12
ing that consecutive trembles are far less likely than ﬁnite sequences of
 isolated trembles occurring at given times of the cycle induced by a
. . self-conﬁrming n , n -solution . 12
11 The complete argument requires looking at the state of belief of player 2 as well; see the
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5.3. An Example
The aim of this subsection is to provide a simple example illustrating the
learning dynamics and its convergence properties. To this end, we con-
. struct an example with both a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution and a 12
. n , n -solution, and we show how the system is likely to go from the 12
4 4 former to the latter. Let n s n s 1, A s U, D , A s L, R .T o 12 1 2
simplify the exposition we will assume that F consists of only two 1
 t4
X 
Xt4 time-independent forecasting rules f s f , f s f such that ;t, 11 11
t . t .
X t .
X t . fUs L , fD s R , and fU s fD s L . The two rules differ in 11 1 1
their predictions when D is played. Similarly, F consists of two time-inde- 2
 t4
X 
Xt4 t. t . pendent forecasting rules f s f , f s f such that ;t, fL s fR 22 22 2 2
X t .
X t . s U and fL s D , fR s U , which differ in their prediction when L 22
.. .. is played. We assume that n LUL ) n LDR and n ULU ) n URU 11 22
. so that the forecasting rule proﬁle f , f is that of a self-conﬁrming 12
.  . n , n -solution on the equilibrium path the actions U and L are played . 12
.. .. We also assume that n LDL ) n LUL , n RUL ) n RDL and 11 11
. . .  . 
XX . n ULD ) n URU , n DLD ) n DRU so that the proﬁle f , f is 22 2 2 1 2
.  . that of a n , n -solution the equilibrium path is DLDL... . We assume 12
.. . that n DLU ) n DRU so that f , f does not correspond to a 22 1 2
.  n , n -solution if the off equilibrium path action D is played, player 2 12
prefers action L to action R given his forecast and this contradicts player
. 1’s forecast . Finally, we assume that players use three levels of plausibility:
k s k s 3. 12
Start from the global state that is most favorable to the self-conﬁrming
.  . n , n -solution generated by f , f . That is, the initial states of belief 12 1 2
. 
X . satisfy sfs 1, sfs 3, for i s 1,2, and the last actions of the initial ii ii
. state correspond to the path induced by the self-conﬁrming n , n -solu- 12
. tion f , f . As long as there are no mistakes the actions U and L are 12
played by players 1 and 2, respectively, and their states of belief remain
unchanged. Assume that at some period t player 1 makes a mistake and
t. t 
X . plays D. Then the new state of belief of player 2 is sfs 1, sfs 2 22 22

XX t y 1 . t y 1 . . f becomes a little more plausible as fL s D and fL s U . 22 2
Given that player 2’s most plausible forecasting rule is f , player 2 selects 2
. the action L if he does not make a mistake at period t q 1 because
 t. .  t . . nDLf L ) n DRf R . That action of player 2 makes the forecast- 22 22
 t . . ing rule f a little less plausible since fD s R and the forecasting rule 11
X 
X t . . fa little more plausible since fD s L to player 1. That is, the new 11
t q 1 . t q 1 
X . state of belief of player 1 is sf s 1, sf s 2. At period t q 2, 11 11
. player 1 chooses U if he does not make a mistake since f is still the 1
most plausible forecasting rule for him and L has just been played. It
follows that the period t q 2 state of belief of player 2 is again s , i.e., 2
tq2. t q 2 
X .
X sf s 1, sf s 3. In later periods t ) t, as long as there are no 22 22PHILIPPE JEHIEL ￿ 290
mistakes the sequence of plays is ULUL..., and the states of belief of
t
Xy1. t
X y 1 
X . t
X
. players 1 and 2 are, respectively, sf s 1, sf s 2 and sfs 11 11 2 2
t
X

X .
X 1, sfs 3. Assume that at some period t player 1 makes again a 22
X t
X
. mistake and plays D. Player 2’s period t state of belief is sfs 1, 22
t
X

X .
X sfs 2, and player 2 selects L at period t q 1. This implies that 22
X X X t q 1 t q 1 . . sf s sf s 2, and therefore player 1’s state of belief may 1111
t
X q 1 t
X q 1 . switch to any state of belief in particular to s , where sf s 3, 11 1
t
X q 1 
X .
X  sf s 1. In such a case, player 1 chooses U at period t q 2 when he 11
.
X t . . 
X t . . does not make a mistake , since n LDf D ) n LUf U and player 2 11 11 X X XX t q 2 t q 2 . . has played L in period t q 1. Then sf s sf s 2, and player 22 22
2’s state of belief is destabilized so that it may switch to s
t
Xq2, where 2
t
Xy2. t
X y 2 
X .
X sf s 3, sf s 1. From then on, f remains player i’s most 22 22 i
plausible forecasting rule for player i s 1,2 as long as there are not
.  . consecutive trembles, and therefore the n , n -solution path DLDL... 12

XX . generated by f , f is played. 12
6. DISCUSSION
The learning process involves several elements of bounded rationality
. in addition to the feature of limited forecasting . We wish now to discuss
the role and interpretation of each assumption.
6.1. On the Finiteness of the Number of Plausibility Le¨els
The state of belief as deﬁned in Section 4 reﬂects some limited capabil-
ity of the players in their information treatment, where the limitation
bears on two points. First the updating of the state of belief relies only on
the information whether the predictions of forecasting rules f g F coin- ii
cide with the observation or not as opposed to how many mistakes are
required to explain the observation with f . Second, each player i restricts i
himself to a ﬁnite number k of plausibility levels as opposed to a i
. potentially larger or inﬁnite number. The ﬁrst limitation is not crucial,
and there would be no conceptual difﬁculty in making the updating depend
on the number of mistakes required to explain the observation with each
. forecasting rule f g F. We have made it for notational purposes. The ii
second limitation is more essential. Correct Bayesian updating would
require a perfect record of how many mistakes are needed to explain past
observations with each forecasting rule in the support of belief. Thus, for t
large enough, with the standard Bayesian view, the plausibility level of
some forecasting rule could go beyond k . It should be noted though that if i
one accepts that player i restricts himself to k plausibility levels, the kind i
 of updating proposed in Section 4 seems reasonable in that it is as close as
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Technically, the bound on the number of plausibility levels allows us to
reduce the learning process to a Markov process with a ﬁnite state space.
This is used to apply the techniques of perturbed Markov processes in
Section 5. On an interpretative level, the bound on the number of
plausibility levels seems a reasonable way to capture the idea that a
boundedly rational player is likely to form his belief on the basis of some
imperfect record of past observations.
12 We wish to stress that our ﬁnding
. that eventually players learn to play a n , n -solution is robust to any 12
change in the bound on the number of plausibility levels as long as
k ) n q 1.
13 In this sense, the limit behavior is not too sensitive to the ii
degree of bounded capability in information treatment.
6.2. On the Uniqueness of the Most Plausible Forecasting Rule
We have assumed that at each point of the process the players have a
 uniquely deﬁned most plausible forecasting rule which, of course, may
. change from period to period . We wish to point out that the above
analysis can easily be extended to the case where the players may have
several most plausible forecasting rules at the same time still assuming
though that when a player has several most plausible forecasting rules
. there is a chance which may be arbitrarily small that his state of belief
 switches to any conceivable state of belief not necessarily one with a
. uniquely deﬁned most plausible forecasting rule . Speciﬁcally, the learning
framework would then be adapted as follows: Each forecasting rule f g F; ii
. would have an a a priori weight denoted m f . Whenever there is no ii
tremble at period t the current action a
t would be chosen so as to i
. t y 1 t . . t y 1
t maximize  m f n aa f a , where a is the period t y 1 f gS 1. iiij i i i j ii
action and the sum bears over all period t most plausible forecasting rules
t. t . . f g S1 i.e., such that sfs 1 . Finally, the updating of players’ states ii i i
. of belief including the possibility of switch would be deﬁned exactly in
the same fashion as in Section 4. With easy adaptations of the proofs, it
can be shown that the learning framework just described yields the same
. asymptotic results Propositions 1 and 2 as the one described above. The
framework with uniquely deﬁned most plausible forecasting rules was
chosen mostly for notational purposes.
12 The limitation imposed by k in the state-of belief does not reduce to bounded recall i
. where the players remember only a ﬁnite number of past actions . If imperfect record were
to take the form of bounded recall, then the result of Proposition 2 would only hold if the
memory capacity of the players increases to inﬁnity at the same time as the probability of
 making a mistake goes to zero the complete argument would be signiﬁcantly harder to
. establish .
13 We have used that assumption to guarantee that forecasting rules which have incorrect
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6.3. On the Random De¨ice When There Are Se¨eral Most Plausible
Forecasting Rules
We have assumed that whenever a player has several forecasting rules
 which may be the most plausible one, there is a chance which may be
. arbitrarily small that the player switches to any conceivable state of belief,
which means that any forecasting rule may become the most plausible one.
On a technical level, we have used that assumption to ensure that the only
absorbing sets of the process without mistakes are the self-conﬁrming
.  n , n -solution clusters. Otherwise, it would a priori be conceivable that 12
the process without mistakes admit other absorbing sets in which the most
. plausible forecasting rule of a player varies in a cyclical fashion, say.
 Whether that assumption is needed for Proposition 2 is an open and
. presumably difﬁcult question left for future research. Note that in the
example, we would obtain the same conclusion if the assumption were to
. be dropped because there are only two forecasting rules.
The random device assumption can again be interpreted in terms of
bounded rationality, and it should be noted that the convergence result to
. n , n -solutions does not depend on the exact speciﬁcation of the distri- 12
bution of change in the state of belief. It is nevertheless probably the least
satisfactory feature in the learning process, and it would be of interest to
analyze what happens asymptotically to the process if that assumption
were to be dropped. A possible defense for the assumption is as follows.
Given that player i’s learning bears on forecasting rules, player i may be
thought of as being mostly concerned with the determination of the most
plausible forecasting rule. When there is exactly one most plausible
forecasting rule, player i is satisﬁed. When there are two or more forecast-
 ing rules that can be the most plausible one, player i is unhappy or feels
. that something is wrong with his belief and must change something. It
seems then reasonable to model that change as a switch to any conceivable
 state of belief where the switch is assumed not to be fully under the
. 14, 15 control of the player .
14 There are other ways to model the disenchantment of player i. For example, when the
previous most plausible forecasting rule becomes as likely as some other forecasting rule,
then the previous most plausible forecasting rule may be assigned to the set of least plausible
forecasting rules with positive probability. Such a speciﬁcation would yield the same asymp-
. totic results with a slightly more complicated proof .
15 Another interpretation of the state of belief perturbation is that the player misperceives
with positive probability the plausibility levels of the forecasting rules other than the most
plausible one, and therefore when there are several most plausible forecasting rules the state
of belief may switch to any conceivable state. In establishing Proposition 2, that interpretation
would, however, require that the probability of misperception goes to zero together with the
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6.4. On the Mistakes
In the learning process we have assumed that each player i could make
a mistake at each period where he must move. Also, the distribution of
mistakes was assumed to be independent from period to period and
stationary. Given the analysis of Section 5 it should be clear that the
feature of the mistake distribution that drives the convergence result is
 that consecutive trembles are far less likely than isolated ones in the
. sense made precise in Deﬁnition 8 . This is because isolated trembles are
.  sufﬁcient to destabilize a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution that is not a 12
. . n , n -solution cluster, whereas consecutive trembles are required to 12
. destabilize a n , n -solution cluster. The asymptotic result of Section 5 12
would thus continue to hold as long as that property is met whether or not
the distributions of mistakes are assumed to be stationary and independent
 from period to period on state-dependent perturbations, see also Bergin
. and Lipman, 1996 .
6.5. On the Forecasting Rule
Throughout the paper, each player i was assumed to make his choice of
 action on the basis of his forecast over the forthcoming n moves includ- i
. ing his own moves . In some cases, the forecast can be thought of as
bearing only on the reaction function of the other player over the forth-
coming n moves. In such cases, one might argue that player i makes a i
plan of actions over the forthcoming n moves given his forecast about the i
reaction function of the other player. His plan of actions leads him in turn
to choose a current action, which is the effective choice to be made in the
current period. At every period where player i must move, player i would
then make plans of actions over the forthcoming n periods yielding a i
choice of current action. For such a process of thought, it may well be that
his effective choices of action in the next periods do not coincide with the
plan originally made even though player i has a correct forecast about the
reaction function of the other player. In other words, this process of
thought might lead to time inconsistencies. In the long run, if player i
learns the reaction function of the other player he should realize that his
plans of actions do not coincide with the actions he effectively chose in the
next periods. The only way for player i to avoid time inconsistencies is to
reduce his current period choice to his current period action. The formula-
tion adopted in this paper is the only one compatible with that view.
7. CONCLUSION
A learning process was proposed in which players eventually learn to
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rationality including some which are not linked to the limited forecasting
. form of bounded rationality. Still, as suggested in the discussion Section 6
. the convergence to n , n -solution is robust to a number of variations of 12
how the other sorts of bounded rationality are modelled as long as the
players are assumed to keep the same length of foresight throughout the
process. A possible extension would allow player i to change his length of
foresight when he feels that he understands sufﬁciently well the forthcom-
. ing n moves as a function of his own move. He might then potentially i
decide to increase his length of foresight from n to n q 1, say. In this ii
. view, starting from the n , n -solution that is currently played, player i 12
might infer from the observed sequence of forthcoming n q 1 actions new i
. n q 1 -length forecasts. In the case this induces a modiﬁcation of his i
. behavior, a second stage of learning would lead to some n q 1, n - ij
.  solution. Otherwise, the original n , n -solution was already a n q 12 i
. 1, n -solution. Such a process of changes of lengths of foresight might be j
pursued for both players deﬁning a new stochastic process. If there exist
. . strategy proﬁles that deﬁne a n , n -solution for all n , n sufﬁciently 12 12
 large such strategy proﬁles are termed hyperstable solutions in Jehiel, ￿
. 1995 , then these are absorbing states of the overall process, and one
might conjecture that they will emerge in the long run. The precise
analysis is left for future research.
16
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. It is rather immediate to check that sets in
. E j S are absorbing. To see this consider a self-conﬁrming n , n -solu- 12
tion state, and observe that when there are no trembles the played actions
. always conﬁrm the prediction of the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution fore- 12
. casting rule. As a result the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution forecasting 12
rule remains the most plausible forecasting rule all along the played path
Moreover, those forecasting rules which give the correct predictions along
the played path keep the same plausibility level and those which give some
incorrect predictions have a plausibility level set to k . i
Conversely, consider an absorbing set. We wish to show that it is
. necessarily a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution cluster. If the same forecast- 12
ing rule remains the most plausible one for each player i all along the
learning process generated by a state in the absorbing set, then it is rather
straightforward to see that the absorbing set must be a self-conﬁrming
16 It might as well be argued that, when a player feels that he understands sufﬁciently well
the sequence of forthcoming actions, he decides to be less sophisticated and reduces his
length of foresight by one increment, say. As long as the length of foresight remains above
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. n , n -solution cluster. If the most plausible forecasting rule does change 12
for at least one player, say player 1, along the learning process generated
by some state in the absorbing set, then it must be that the random device
in the updating process of player 1’s state of belief is triggered at some
points in time. Consider such a period t. There is a positive probability
that the next state of belief of player 1 corresponds to that of a self-con-
. ﬁrming n , n -solution state. If player 2’s state of belief corresponds to 12
. that same self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state, then the Markov process 12
. has reached a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution cluster which is absorbing. 12
It will thus never return to the original absorbing set, yielding a contradic-
tion. If player 2’s state of belief does not correspond to that self-conﬁrming
.  . n , n -solution state, then eventually after a ﬁnite number of periods 12
some forecasting rule of player 2 other than the most plausible at period t
will become equally plausible. At such a time the random device of the
updating of player 2 will be triggered and there is a positive probability
that player 2’s new state of belief now corresponds to the self-conﬁrming
. 17 n , n -solution state. From then on, the system will never leave the 12
. associated self-conﬁrming n , n -solution cluster, and therefore will never 12
return to the original absorbing set, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
.  . Proof of Lemma 1. 1 Consider a n , n -solution state. Assume 12
player 1 makes a mistake at period t, and that there is no further tremble
. up to period t q 2Max n , n . We ﬁrst analyze the effect of such a 12
tremble on player 1’s state of belief. Compared to the description in the
main text, the only difference is that, at period t q n , the current most 1
plausible forecasting rule of player 1 yields a correct prediction, and
therefore the updating can only reinforce player 1’s belief in his most
 plausible forecasting rule the plausibility level of those forecasting rules
which yielded incorrect predictions after the period t tremble will increase
. . by one increment if possible . Regarding the effect of player 1’s tremble
on player 2, we note that it is only temporary and after 2n periods, player 2
2’s state of belief returns to his original period t state of belief. Clearly,
the argument shows that inﬁnite sequences of isolated trembles are unable
. to destabilize a n , n -solution cluster. 12
.  . 2 Consider a self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state that is not a 12
. n , n -solution state. As explained in the main text, consider a time of 12
. the cycle induced by the self-conﬁrming n , n -solution where the most 12
plausible forecasting rule of a player, say player 1, yields an incorrect
prediction off the equilibrium path. Assume that a tremble occurs at such
a time, say at period t, and yields an action with an incorrect n -length 1
17 If in the meantime the random device of player 1 is triggered there is always a positive
. probability that he returns always to the same self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state of belief. 12PHILIPPE JEHIEL ￿ 296
 . . prediction with no tremble before 2Max n , n periods . The effect on 12
player 1’s subsequent states of belief has been described in the main text.
If the updating at period t q n yields several most plausible forecasting 1
rules to player 1 then his state of belief will switch. If the updating at
period t q n yields a uniquely deﬁned most plausible forecasting rule, 1
then there is no random switch in player 1’s state of belief at period
t q n , but after period t q 2n the plausibility level of some forecasting 11
 rules yielding the correct predictions on the equilibrium path and after
. the period t tremble has reduced by one increment. Moreover as noted
. earlier the effect of player 1’s, tremble on player 2 is only temporary and
after 2n periods, player 2’s state of belief has returned to his original 2
. period t state of belief there is no experimentation for player 2 . Clearly,
after at most k y 1 such isolated trembles, there will be a period where 1
. in the updating process player 1 has more than one plausible forecasting
rule. Player 1’s state of belief may then switch to any state of belief, in

X. . particular to a state s such that sfs 1, sfs kfor every forecast- 11 1 1 1 1
X 
XX . . ing rule f / f , where f , f is the forecasting rule proﬁle of a n , n - 11 1 2 1 2
.
X solution for some player 2’s forecasting rule f . Let f be player 2’s most 22
plausible forecasting rule at the time of the switch. Lemma 1 follows if

X . . 
X . f , f is the forecasting rule proﬁle of some n , n -solution. If f , f is 12 1 2 12
. not the forecasting rule proﬁle of a n , n -solution, then two cases may 12

X . . arise. Either f , f is the forecasting rule proﬁle of a subjective n , n - 12 12

X . solution or not. When f , f does not correspond to a subjective 12
. n , n -solution, then player 2’s state of belief will be destabilized even 12
 without further trembles. That is, after a ﬁnite number of periods without
. trembles , player 2’s updating will result in several most plausible forecast-

X . . ing rules. When f , f does correspond to a subjective n , n -solution 12 1 2
. which is not a n , n -solution, then by the same argument displayed for 12
player 1, one can show that player 2’s state of belief will be destabilized
. 18 after a ﬁnite number at most k y 1 of player 2’s isolated trembles. 2
When player 2’s state of belief is destabilized, there is a chance that his

X. . state of belief switches to s , where sfs 1, and sfs kfor other 22 2 2 2 2
forecasting rules, where f
X is player 2’s forecasting rule that has been 2

XX . . . introduced above i.e., f , f deﬁnes a n , n -solution . We have thus 12 1 2
. shown that a ﬁnite number at most k q k y 2 of isolated trembles may 12
. lead with positive probability to a n , n -solution state. Q.E.D. 12
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 follows from Proposition 1, Lemma
 1, the general analysis of perturbed Markov processes see Freidlin and
. Wentzell, 1984 , and the observation that when the probability of tremble
18 If player 1’s state of belief is destabilized in the meantime, his state of belief may go back
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 goes to zero a ﬁnite sequence of isolated trembles occurring at given
. times of a cycle of ﬁnite length is inﬁnitely more likely than consecutive
 trembles over a number T f Nr« of periods where N s k q k y 2i s 12
the maximum number of isolated trembles required to destabilize a
. . self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state, see above . The reason is that, over 12
T s N r « periods, the expected number of trembles is N, and as « goes to
zero the probability that there be consecutive trembles becomes negligible
as opposed to the probability of having N isolated trembles destabilizing
. some given self-conﬁrming n , n -solution state. Q.E.D. 12
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